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BANKRUPTCY-DoEs BANKRUPTCY CODE SECTION

106

Au

THORIZE A WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS CLAIMS?
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are a lower-middle-class taxpayer and you
have finally realized your lifelong dream of starting your own busi
ness.l After years of having to punch someone else's clock, you are
finally ready to hang up your own shingle. You hope that the joy
felt during the ribbon-cutting ceremony is a sign of a long and pros
perous financial future. Unfortunately, your business does not
prosper. There are simply no customers to be found. On the other
hand, you have no trouble attracting the attention of your creditors.
It seems as though past-due notices are now arriving hourly. After
weeks of avoiding the inevitable, your bookkeeper says the words
you have been dreading: "You're bankrupt." The words hit you
with force, as though you have been told that you are dying. 2
All is not lost, however. Your bookkeeper explains the bank
ruptcy process to you. The modern bankruptcy system, you are
told, is more about reconciliation than about punishing someone
who cannot make good on his or her debts.3 By submitting to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, you will be offered the chance
for a fresh financial start. 4 More importantly, once you file for
bankruptcy, the court will issue a discharge injunction, which elimi
nates certain debts and prevents further attempts to collect on
them.s Having spent the last few weeks dreading the telephone
calls of increasingly impatient creditors, you decide to file for
bankruptcy.
1. The following hypothetical incorporates elements from Atkins v. United States
(In re Atkins), 279 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002), and Matthews v. United States (In
re Matthews), 184 B.R. 594 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1995).
2. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS-BANKRUPTCY
AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 3 (1989) ("Bankrupt .... The single word is a
body blow, like '[d]ead."').
3. DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 4 (4th ed. 2006).
4. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
5. 11 U.S.c. § 524 (2000 & Supp. 2006). See generally U.S. Courts, The Discharge
in Bankruptcy, http://www.uscourts.govlbankruptcycourtslbankruptcybasics/discharge.
html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
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Then, shortly after the discharge takes effect, you start receiv
ing past due notices again. You are surprised because the debts to
which these notices refer supposedly were discharged. At first, you
assume these are mere administrative oversights and ignore them.
When they keep coming, you write to the creditor and explain that
the debt in question was discharged. In response you receive a no
tice threatening you with criminal sanctions. As the phone calls and
demand letters increase, you begin to feel depressed. It seems as
though you will never escape your debts. You hoped that filing for
bankruptcy would put a stop to sleepless nights, but they have re
turned with force. The worry is beginning to make you physically
ill. Your spouse and children are also troubled by the situation. Fi
nally, you receive a notice from the creditor: "After careful consid
eration, cancellation of the balance remaining on your debt has
been approved."
Can you sue the creditor for the emotional distress that its ac
tions have caused? The answer should be yes, if you can also prove
the requisite causation. Overzealous bill collectors have been held
liable for emotional distress in the past. 6 However, the answer to
this question now lies in another question, who was the creditor?
In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, despite case
law to the contrary,7 that the Bankruptcy Code contains no waiver
of sovereign immunity for claims of emotional distress. 8 Thus,
debtors who have been emotionally harmed by government credi
tors cannot be compensated for their emotional distress.
This Note will discuss the application of the Bankruptcy Code's
sovereign immunity waiver to claims of emotional distress caused
by the government's violations of a discharge injunction. Part I will
provide background information on the concept of sovereign immu
nity. Part II will discuss the history of the Bankruptcy Code in gen
eral, with specific emphasis placed on the discharge injunction,9 the
6. E.g., Delta Fin. Co. v. Ganakas, 91 S.E.2d 383, 385-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956)
(holding debt collector liable for frightening a child of debtor during attempted repos
session of a television set); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 345 N.E.2d 37, 38-39 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976) (holding a collector liable who made multiple, disparaging phone calls to
debtor).
7. Atkins v. United States (In re Atkins), 279 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002);
Matthews v. United States (In re Matthews), 184 B.R. 594, 595 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1995);
see also First Impressions, 2 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 459, 463-64 (2006) (listing In re
Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005), as a case of first impression).
8. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 31.
9. 11 U.S.c. § 524 (2000).
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waiver of sovereign immunity,lO and the bankruptcy court's en
forcement powers.ll Part III will provide a brief case history of
emotional distress claims brought against the government for viola
tion of a discharge injunction, with specific emphasis on the recent
case In re Rivera Torres .12 Part IV will discuss the various types of
damages and how they are classified. Finally, Part V will reexamine
the Rivera Torres decision and conclude that the Bankruptcy
Code's sovereign immunity waiver should extend to emotional dis
tress claims.
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
ITS INTERPRETATION13

Sovereign immunity is the doctrine under which a sovereign
government is immune from suit absent specific legislative authori
zation to the contrary.14 The federal right to sovereign immunity is
not derived from any specific statute or constitutional provision, but
is "so firmly entrenched as to be substantially beyond question in
10. 11 U.S.c. § 106.
11. 11 U.S.c. § 105 (2000 & Supp. 2006).
12. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20.
13. For the purposes of this Note, waivers of sovereign immunity will refer only to
the abrogation of federal sovereign immunity. State sovereign immunity is derived
from the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. ("The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Jeffrey K. O'Connor,
Note, Is It the Officer or the Gentleman?: Issues of Capacity in § 1983 Actions Brought
in Federal Court, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 323, 327 (2006) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment is the "textual reflection" of the sovereign immunity doctrine). Prior to
2006, there was much debate over the constitutionality of Congress's abrogation of the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. However, in Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that abrogation of sovereign
immunity was unnecessary in bankruptcy proceedings against state governments
because the ability of the federal government to subject states to jurisdiction is within
the federal government's constitutional powers to administer bankruptcy law. Cent. Va.
Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006) ("The relevant question is not whether
Congress has 'abrogated' States' immunity in proceedings to recover preferential
transfers.... The question, rather, is whether Congress' determination that States
should be amenable to such proceedings is within the scope of its power to enact 'Laws
on the subject of Bankruptcies.' We think it beyond peradventure that it is." (citation
omitted». See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9I 106.02 (14th ed. 2006)
(describing in detail the history of the debate over federal abrogation of sovereign
immunity); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Congressional Response to Hoffman and Nordic
Village: Amended Section 106 and Sovereign Immunity, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 341-47
(1995).
14. Joseph D. Block, Suits Against Government Officers and the Sovereign Immu
nity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1060 (1946).
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the federal courts. "15 Formally recognized for the first time in
1821,16 the doctrine has since been described as predating, and thus
impliedly incorporated in, the ConstitutionP This Part will look
first at the rationales given for the doctrine's existence and will then
discuss the various interpretations the courts have given to the
doctrine.
A.

Reasons and Rationales for Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity has its origins in the English common law
concept that" 'the King can do no wrong.' "18 Modern legal schol
ars consider this primary rationale an anachronism in a government
purported to be based on law and not on men. 19 Today, sovereign
immunity is a somewhat controversial concept, with a majority of
legal scholars rejecting the doctrine. 20 As a result, several different
rationales exist for the modern application of the doctrine.
15. David A. Webster, Beyond Federal Sovereign Immunity: 5 U.S.C. § 702 Spells
Relief, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 725, 726 (1988). But cf Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 811
(1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is much irony in the Court's profession that it
grounds its opinion on a deeply rooted historical tradition of sovereign immunity, when
the Court abandons a principle nearly as inveterate, and much closer to the hearts of
the Framers: that where there is a right, there must be a remedy.").
16. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821).
17. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 ("[T]he States' immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States' enjoyed before the ratification of the Consti
tution, and which they retain today.").
18. Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Maysonet
Robles v. Cabrero, 323 F.3d 43, 54 (1st Cir. 2003)); see also Edwin M. Borchard, Gov
ernmental Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1,2 (1924) (arguing that sovereign immunity's
English development was based on misconceptions of early law and practice).
19. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 12 (2004)
("Sovereign Immunity is inconsistent with a central maxim of American government:
that no one, not even the government, is above the law."); William A. Fletcher, A His
toricalInterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirm
ative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 1033, 1040-41 (1983); John E. H. Sherry, The Myth that the King Can Do No
Wrong: A Comparative Study of the Sovereign Immunity Doctrine in the United States
and New York Court of Claims, 22 ADMIN. L. REV. 39,56-57 (1969); Carlos Manuel
Vazquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1685-86 (1997)
("The Eleventh Amendment has long been regarded as an embarrassment to the
United States's [sic] aspirations to be a government of laws and not of men."); Webster,
supra note 15, at 727; see also Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 405-06 ("We must ascribe
the [Eleventh A]mendment, then, to some other cause than the dignity of a State.").
20. John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear State
ment Rules, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 775 (1995); see also United States v. Hom, 29 F.3d
754, 762 n.7 (1st Cir. 1994) ("For its part, the scholarly community has been overwhelm
ingly hostile to the doctrine."). But see David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Semi
nole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 547-48 (1997) (arguing that sovereign immunity is
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A second rationale that has been discarded by modern theo
rists is that courts are unable to entertain suits against the govern
ment because they have no enforcement power over the
executive. 21 A more modern approach to this rationale roots sover
eign immunity in the doctrine of constitutional separation of pow
ers.22 Sovereign immunity, it is argued, protects the elected
branches of government from incursion by the unelected federal
jUdiciary.23
The more prominent theory of sovereign immunity is based on
governmental efficiency.24 Suits by individual citizens against the
government interfere with the performance of the government and
serve as a potential drain on resources that should be used for the
benefit of all citizens.25 Thus, sovereign immunity protects the
common good by "forcing individuals to bear their own losses suf
fered at the hands of government. "26
B.

Interpreting Sovereign Immunity Waivers

Where the government wishes to waive its immunity, it does so
by passing a specific statutory waiver. 27 Courts interpreting waivers
of sovereign immunity employ either a strict or a liberal construc
constitutionally sound); Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1529 (1992) (offering a defense of sovereign immunity).
21. Gliddon Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570-71 (1962) (allowing the court to
hear the suit despite its reliance on other branches for enforcement powers); Roger C.
Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory
Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68
MICH. L. REV. 387, 397 (1970); Webster, supra note 15, at 727 (noting the rejection of
this theory). For an example of the application of this rationale, see Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("[T]here can be no legal right as against the au
thority that makes the law on which the right depends.").
22. Webster, supra note 15, at 727. The separation of powers refers to the system
whereby power is delegated between the three branches of government so that no one
branch can control the other two. See generally U.S. Constitution Online, Constitu
tional Topic: Separation of Powers, http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_sepp.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2007) (describing the concept of separation of powers in the
United States, as well as in several other nations).
23. Webster, supra note 15, at 727.
24. Id.
25. Block, supra note 14, at 1062; Webster, supra note 15, at 727; see also United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 206 (1882).
26. Webster, supra note 15, at 727. However, this theory becomes increasingly
less plausible as more waivers of government immunity are granted. Id. at 727 n.18.
27. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 6 (1993); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (2000) (waiving immunity against torts committed by government employees
while acting on behalf of the government); id. § 1491 (waiving sovereign immunity in
cases involving government contracts).
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tion to that waiver. 28 Courts that apply a strict construction to sov
ereign immunity waivers assign narrow meanings to statutory
terms. 29 These courts require that a waiver of sovereign immunity
be unequivocally expressed in order to be valid. 30 Thus, waivers are
construed in the narrowest sense. 31 Further, any conditions placed
on a waiver are observed in the strictest sense with no implied ex
ceptions. 32 These courts hesitate to impose monetary claims against
the government, regardless of an explicit waiver of sovereign immu
nity or of a statute's remedial nature.33 In its most extreme form,
this approach eliminates all forms of extrinsic evidence, relying
solely on the text of the statute itself to determine the scope of the
waiver. 34
Alternatively, courts applying a liberal interpretation to waiv
ers of sovereign immunity interpret statutory terms expansively.35
28. See Nagle, supra note 20, at 778.
29. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY IN
TERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 55 (2002) ("Strict statute inter
pretation is assigning narrow meaning to words. ").
30. Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261 (1999); Lane v. Pena,
518 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1996); Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990).
31. E.g., Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 601-02 (2005) ("[A] waiver of sover
eign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign."); see also U.S.
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 622-23 (1992) (applying the more restrictive
interpretation and holding that a waiver for "coercive" fines does not imply a waiver for
"punitive" fines).
32. E.g., Irwin, 498 U.S. at 97 (White, J., concurring) ("[C)onditions on the Gov
ernment's waiver of sovereign immunity ... must be 'strictly observed and exceptions
thereto are not to be implied.'" (citations omitted) (quoting Lehman v. Nakshian, 453
U.S. 156, 161 (1981»).
33. Nagle, supra note 20, at 778-79. Statutes are considered remedial if they
"provide a remedy, or improve or facilitate remedies already existing for the enforce
ment of rights and the redress of injuries." 3 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STAT
UTORY CONSTRUCTION § 60:2 (6th ed. 2006); see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29,
at 60 ("A remedial statute is one intended to fix an existing problem rather than, for
example, a taxing or revenue raising statute.").
34. Nagle, supra note 20, at 772. For example, in several key cases, the Court
refused to consider the purpose of a statute in deciding whether the statute waived
sovereign immunity. E.g., United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 37 (1992) ("If
clarity does not exist [in the statute], it cannot be supplied by a committee report.").
We have no doubt that the broad purposes of the EAJA would be served by
making the statute applicable to deportation proceedings .... But we cannot
extend the EAJA to administrative deportation proceedings when the plain
language of the statute, coupled with the strict construction of waivers of sov
ereign immunity, constrain us to do otherwise.
Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 138 (1991).
35. Fed. Hous. Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940) ("[S]uch waivers by Con
gress of governmental immunity ... should be liberally construed."); see also BROWN &
BROWN, supra note 29, at 55 ("A liberal interpretation is the reverse [of strict interpre
tation]: words are expansively interpreted. ").
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These courts are more likely to characterize the concept of sover
eign immunity as disfavored. 36 Rather than assuming that sover
eign immunity was retained unless specifically waived, these courts
assume that sovereign immunity has been waived unless specifically
retained. 37 Courts that interpret sovereign immunity liberally have
become increasingly less common.38 Many courts now take the
more neutral approach of using legislative history to determine
whether Congress intended to waive immunity in the situation at
bar. 39
II.

THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

Punishing defaulting debtors was the primary goal of the
world's first bankruptcy statutes. 40 In fact, the term "bankruptcy"
is said to derive from the medieval practice of breaking the bench
of a banker or tradesman who could not repay his debts.41 The first
English bankruptcy statute, passed in 1543, retained this penal tone
by providing for the imprisonment of defaulting debtors.42 The
evolution of American bankruptcy law, however, demonstrates an
increasing emphasis on rehabilitation rather than punishment. 43
36. Nagle, supra note 20, at 779; see, e.g., Anderson v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co.,
153 N.E. 28, 29-30 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) ("The exemption of the sovereign from
suit involves hardship enough where the consent has been withheld. We are not to add
to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced.").
37. Burr, 309 U.S. at 245; Nagle, supra note 20, at 779.
38. Nagle, supra note 20, at 779-80. But see United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596,
622 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Its persistence cannot be denied but ought not to
be celebrated. Nor should its fictive origin ever be forgotten."); Franchise Tax Bd. v.
U.S. Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 520 (1984) (liberally construing a sue-and-be-sued
clause). Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens is a prominent modern critic of sov
ereign immunity. John Paul Stevens, Is Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1121,
1129 (1993) ("[T]he legitimate interests served by the ancient doctrine of immunity can
be better protected by legislative rules, or even judge-made rules, that are responsive to
those specific concerns rather than by an archaic blunderbuss.").
39. Nagle, supra note 20, at 780.
40. BAIRD, supra note 3, at 4; Robert P. Wasson, Jr., Remedying Violations of the
Discharge Injunction Under Bankruptcy Code § 524, Federal Non-Bankruptcy Law, and
State Law Comports with Congressional Intent, Federalism, and Supreme Court Jurispru
dence for Identifying the Existence of an Implied Right of Action, 20 BANKR. DEV. J. 77,
91-93 (2003) (describing the evolution of bankruptcy law from Roman law to the mod
ern U.S. Bankruptcy Code).
41. Wasson, supra note 40, at 91. Another translation indicates that the debtor's
entire business was destroyed. Id. at 91 n.37.
42. Id. at 92.
43. See id. at 94-96; see also STEFAN A. RIESENFELD, CASES & MATERIALS ON
CREDITORS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTIONS 457-58 (4th ed. 1987).
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The Evolution of Bankruptcy and the Discharge in the United
States

The United States' first bankruptcy statute was passed in
1800.44 The statute was characterized as "stringent" for requiring
two-thirds of creditors to consent before a discharge was ordered. 45
Opposition from creditors led to its repeal in 1803.46 The second
statute,47 active for only eighteen months, featured a liberalized
right to a discharge for all persons unless a majority of creditors
filed a written dissent. 48 The third statute,49 passed in 1867 and re
pealed in 1878, further liberalized the scope of eligibility and al
lowed corporations to seek bankruptcy protection. 50 Although the
previous statutes were generally short-lived, the fourth federal
bankruptcy act51 is notable for its longevity. 52 Passed in 1898, this
Act remained in effect, albeit subject to a near complete revision,53
until it was replaced by the modern bankruptcy code in 1978. 54
B.

Section 524: The Effect of a Discharge Injunction

When a petition for bankruptcy is filed, most of the petitioner's
debts are automatically discharged, subject to several statutory ex
ceptions. 55 Section 524 codifies the injunctive effect of the dis
charge order. 56 The discharge injunction not only prevents
creditors from filing suit to recover discharged debts, but it also pre
vents many other collection actions, such as telephone calls, letters,
and personal contacts, intended to bring about repayment. 57 When
44.
45.

Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 457 n.20.
46. Id. at 457.
47. Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441 (repealed 1842).
48. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 457, 457 n.23.
49. Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176,14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
50. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 457.
51. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
52. RIESENFELD, supra note 43, at 458; Wasson, supra note 40, at 95.
53. Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978).
54. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.c.); Wasson, supra note 40, at 95.
55. u.S. Courts, supra note 5. Which debts will be discharged depends mostly on
the chapter of the Bankruptcy Code under which the petitioner files. Id.; see also id.
§ 727 (2000) (chapter 7 liquidation); id. § 944 (municipal debtors); id. § 1141 (chapter
11); id. § 1228 (family farmers); id. § 1328 (chapter 13 reorganization). Regardless of
the chapter, section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code contains a broad listing of debts not
subject to the discharge. Id. § 523(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
56. 11 U.S.c. § 524(a) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
57. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY n 524.01-.02[2] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds.,
15th ed. 2006).
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faced with a creditor's violation of a discharge injunction, most
bankruptcy courts will order actual damages, attorneys' fees, and,
where appropriate, punitive damages. 58
Historically, the term "discharge" referred to both the release
of debts and the release of the debtor from prison. 59 Under the
present bankruptcy system, the discharge is viewed almost exclu
sively as a rehabilitative tool. 60 For bankruptcy filers consumed by
debt, a discharge order is "financial death and financial rebirth."61
The order and the injunction it creates against collection activities
grant the debtor a fresh start. 62 For creditors, the discharge
presents little hardship since the debtor's bankruptcy indicates the
minimal probability that the debt would have been repaid. 63 For
these reasons, the discharge, with its injunctive function, is viewed
as a debtor's most important benefit. 64
C.

Section 106: A Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

When a government creditor violates the discharge injunction,
the normal rules of the discharge injunction must be viewed
through the prism of § 106, which operates as a waiver of sovereign
immunity for several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 65 In a ba
sic sense, the purpose of § 106 is to treat the government in nearly
the same manner as private creditors for the purposes of bank
ruptcy proceedings. 66 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained no
58. Bessette v. Avco Fin. Serv., 230 F.3d 439, 445 (1st Cir. 2000); In re Perviz, 302
B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2003).
59. Cent. Va. Cmty. ColI. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 364 (2006) ("Indeed, the earliest
English statutes governing bankruptcy and insolvency authorized discharges of persons,
not debts."). See generally John C. McCoid, II, Discharge: The Most Important Devel
opment in Bankruptcy History, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 163, 165-85 (1996) (describing and
interpreting the original British discharge statutes).
60. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUITCY LAW 225
(1986); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 ("When a judge signs a paper titled 'Dis
charge,' debts legally disappear."); McCoid, supra note 59, at 192 ("Seen in historical
context, the discharge was the ultimate instrument of the transformation of bankruptcy
from a creditors' collection remedy to a system of statutorily mandated composition
mutually beneficial to debtors and creditors.").
61. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 2, at 4.
62. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coli., 546 U.S. at 364 ("[T]he ultimate discharge ... gives the
debtor a 'fresh start' by releasing him, her, or it from further liability for old debts.");
JACKSON, supra note 60, at 225.
63. BAIRD, supra note 3, at 35.
64. Wasson, supra note 40, at 95.
65. 11 U.S.c. § 106 (2000).
66. Gibson, supra note 13, at 311.
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explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.67 The result was a one-sided
system: the government could act as a creditor in bankruptcy pro
ceedings, forcing the debtor to litigate any claims it had against the
government in a completely separate forum. 68 The original version
of § 10669 included a waiver of sovereign immunity "with respect to
any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the
estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrences out
of which such governmental unit's claim arose."70 Further, the stat
ute required that a judicial determination would be binding upon
governmental units.71
Questions of interpretation arose almost immediately follow
ing the passage of this section, particularly in regard to the reconcil
iation of the rather limited waivers in subsections (a) and (b) with
the seemingly broad waiver in subsection (C)J2 Specifically, ques
tions arose as to whether the section authorized monetary recovery
against the governmenU3 Two Supreme Court decisions made it
clear that § 106 required redrafting. 74
67. 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, <J[ 106.04.
68. S. REp. No. 95-989, at 30 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815
("The governmental unit cannot receive a distribution from the estate without subject
ing itself to any liability it has to the estate within the confines of a compulsory counter
claim rule. Any other result would be one-sided."); Richard A. Greene, Comment,
Waivering in the Sight of an Adversary, Bankruptcy Code Section 106 and the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 531, 538 (2002).
69. 11 U.S.c. § 106 (1978) (amended 1994), as reprinted in 2 COLLIER, supra note
13, <J[ 106.LH[1]. The original version of § 106 reads:
(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity
with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of
the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrences out of
which such governmental unit's claim arose.
(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a govern
mental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the
estate.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and not
withstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity
(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor," "entity," or "gov
ernmental unit" applies to governmental units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a pro
vision binds governmental units.
Id.
70. Id. § 106(a).
71. Id. § 106(c)(2).
72. Gibson, supra note 13, at 316. This ambiguity may have been a result of a
compromise over the scope of differing versions of the initial bill. See id. at 313-16.
73. Greene, supra note 68, at 539.
74. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3350-51.
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In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Mainte
nance,75 the Court held that the language of § 106(c) referred only
to declaratory and injunctive relief and not to monetary recovery.7 6
The Court reasoned that the statute's use of the term "determina
tions" rather than "claims" or "rights of payment," led to the con
clusion that the statute did not authorize monetary recovery from
the states.7 7 United States v. Nordic Village, Inc. ,78 decided three
years later, applied the same basic logic to claims against the federal
government.79 As a result of these decisions, a debtor could only
receive monetary damages from the government for Bankruptcy
Code violations by filing a counterclaim to a preexisting govern
ment suit. 80 If the government did not file a suit, the debtor had no
standing. 81 In the years following these decisions, bankruptcy
courts struggled to fulfill the strict requirements imposed by Hoff
man and Nordic Village. 82
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 amended § 106 to specifi
cally include monetary relief in an action against the government. 83
More importantly, the amended § 10684 was intended specifically to
75. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 (1989).
76. Id. at 102. See infra Part IV for a discussion of damage classifications.
77. Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 102; see also supra note 13 (discussing the distinction
between waivers of federal and state sovereign immunity).
78. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
79. Id. at 33-37.
80. Greene, supra note 68, at 540.
81. Nichols v. IRS (In re Nichols), 143 B.R. 104, 108 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992)
("Multiple and egregious violations ... go uncompensated merely because the IRS is
the violator, and it has not filed a proof of claim.").
82. Gibson, supra note 13, at 321-22; Nagle, supra note 20, at 796; see, e.g., Nich
ols, 143 B.R. at 108 (noting, with frustration, the binding effect of Nordic Village).
83. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.c.).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). The amended version of § 106 reads:
(a) Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immu
nity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this sec
tion with respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502,
503,505,506,510,522,523,524,525,542,543,544,545,546,547,548,549,550,
551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944,
1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303,
1305, and 1327 of this title.
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect
to the application of such sections to governmental units.
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, pro
cess, or judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Pro
cedure, including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not
including an award of punitive damages. Such order or judgment for costs or
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overrule the holdings in Hoffman and Nordic Village. 85 The section
by section committee report makes specific reference to both cases
before stating:
This amendment expressly provides for a waiver of sovereign im
munity by governmental units with respect to monetary recov
eries as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. It is the
Committee's intent to make section 106 conform to the Congres
sional intent of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 waiving the
sovereign immunity of the States and the Federal Government in
this regard. 86

The net effect of the amendment: was to omit the ambiguous
subsection (c) and replace it with a new, more specific subsection
(a).87 The new subsection (a) specifically lists sixty sections of the
Code, including § 524, where the government has explicitly waived
sovereign immunity.88 Subsection (a)(3), in a strong rebuke of both
Hoffman and Nordic Village, allows the bankruptcy courts to issue
"an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not includ
ing an award of punitive damages. "89
With the passage of the 1994 amendments, Congress hoped
that the language would clarify the concerns expressed in Hoffman
and Nordic Village. 90 As Representative Berman stated:
fees under this title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with the provisions and limitations of
section 2412( d)(2)(A) of title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment against
any governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law
applicable to such governmental unit and, in the case of a money judgment
against the United States, shall be paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a
district court of the United States.
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief
or cause of action not otherwise existing under this title, the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law.
Id.

85. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3350-51.
86. Id.
87. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 § 113.
88. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(I). Notably absent from the list of waived sections is
§ 541. This was done to prevent a debtor from bringing tort claims completely unre
lated to bankruptcy in the bankruptcy courts. 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 'lI 106.05[1];
Greene, supra note 68, at 540-41. Also included is § 728, which related to special tax
provisions. Although repealed in 2005, the reference to § 728 remains within the text of
§ 106(a)(I). See Bankruptcy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.c.).
89. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (emphasis added).
90. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42.
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First, I am very pleased by the inclusion of Section 113 in the bill,
effectively overruling the decisions of the Supreme Court in U.S.
versus Nordic Village and Hoffman versus Connecticut Depart
ment of Income Maintenance, and clarifying the original intent of
Congress in enacting Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code with
regard to sovereign immunity.91

However, while the rewritten subsection put to rest the concerns
over whether there was a waiver of sovereign immunity at all, at
least one commentator noted that new concerns would arise over
the scope of that waiver. 92
C.

Section 105: The Bankruptcy Court's Enforcement Powers

Section 105, the Bankruptcy Code's enforcement provision, al
lows bankruptcy courts to make "any order, process, or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this
title."93 In attempting to construe this grant of authority, most
courts see § 105 as a broad grant of authority to implement the ex
press and implied goals of the Bankruptcy Code by filling in the
gaps left by the statutory language. 94 However, some have argued
for the application of a more narrow construction. 95 There is gen
eral agreement that a bankruptcy court does not have the power to
fix every problem a debtor brings to it. 96
91. 140 CONGo REC. 27,699 (1994) (emphasis added).
92. Gibson, supra note 13, at 329.
93. 11 U.S.c. § 105(a).
The court may issue any order; process, or judgment that is necessary or ap
propriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title
providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to
preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determi
nation necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules,
or to prevent an abuse of process.
Id.

94. E.g., United States V. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545,549 (1990) ("These stat
utory directives are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy
courts, as courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relation
ships."); 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 'lI 105.01[2] ("Bankruptcy courts, both through their
inherent powers as courts and through the general grant of power in section 105, are
able to police their dockets and afford appropriate relief. ").
95. See Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy
Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1,
25-50 (2005) (arguing that the characterization of bankruptcy courts as courts of equity
is incorrect).
96. E.g., GAF Corp. V. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 26
B.R. 405, 409-10 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (,"Section 105 is not without limits. It does
not permit the court to ignore, supersede, suspend or even misconstrue the statute itself
or the rules.''' (quoting 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY'll 105.02 (15th ed. 1982»), affd, 40
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The legislative history of § 105 demonstrates a gradual broad
ening of the powers of the bankruptcy courts. 97 The predecessor to
the modern § 105 provided that a bankruptcy court's order must be
"necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act. "98
The 1978 enactment of the new language, allowing the bankruptcy
court to also issue orders "appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title," is characterized as evidence that Congress intended
bankruptcy courts to deal with all aspects of a bankruptcy proceed
ing.99 Subsequent amendments have consistently broadened the
bankruptcy court's power by giving judges a greater ability to im
prove docket and case management. lOO
III.

CASE LAW: SUING THE IRS FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Prior to 2005, only two reported cases involved the recovery of
emotional distress damages against the government for violations of
the discharge injunction,lol These cases contain little substantive
discussion of sovereign immunity.lo2 For this reason, In re Rivera
Torres was considered a case of first impression, as it was the only
case to examine the issue of sovereign immunity itself.lo3
A.

The Absence of Issue: The Bankruptcy Courts

Following the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, only
two cases arose in which the government was held liable to a tax
payer for emotional distress as a result of violating a discharge inB.R. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 9I 105.01[2] ("[T]he power
granted to the bankruptcy courts under section 105 is not boundless and should not be
employed as a panacea for all ills confronted in the bankruptcy case.").
97. See 2 COLLIER, supra note 13, 9I 105.LH.
98. 11 U.S.c. § 11(a)(15) (repealed 1978), as reprinted in 2 COLLIER, supra note
13, 9I 105.LH.
99. In re James, 20 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (" 'The basic intention
of the section is to enable the bankruptcy court to do whatever is necessary to aid its
jurisdiction, i.e., anything arising in or relating to a bankruptcy case.''' (quoting 2 COL.
LlER ON BANKRUPTCY 9I 105.04 (15th ed. 1982».
100. See Bankruptcy Judge, United States Trustee, and Family Farmers Bank
ruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, tit. I, § 203, 100 Stat 3088, 3097 (adding the
second sentence to § 105(a» (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S. C.);
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4108-09
(adding § 105(d), which allows the court to schedule status conferences) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.c.).
101. Atkins v. United States (In re Atkins), 279 B.R. 639 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2002);
Matthews v. United States (In re Matthews), 184 B.R 594 (Bankr. D. Ala. 1995).
102. Atkins, 279 B.R 639; Matthews, 184 B.R. 594.
103. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005); First Impressions, supra note
7, at 463-64 (listing Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, as a case of first impression).
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junction. 104 In re Matthews held, without any discussion, that the
government was liable for the plaintiff's claims of mental
anguish.!Os The government in Matthews objected only to the
plaintiff's claim of punitive damages, because these damages were
expressly prohibited by the statute. 106 The only discussion on the
matter of remedies involved calculating an appropriate measure of
the plaintiff's injury.l07
Bankruptcy Judge Littlefield described the facts of In re Atkins
as "a portrait of a large bureaucracy running amuck."!08 Judge
Littlefield made clear his contempt for the government's "fourteen
years of ongoing 'torture'" of the debtor .109 He was not alone: The
government's counsel was quoted in the opinion as saying, "There
was no question that the Government was wrong," and conceding
"the interest of the client right now is just to have the court award
an amount. "110 Despite the dramatic fact pattern, Atkins sheds no
more light on the waiver of sovereign immunity than did Matthews.
B.

Taking Issue: The Court of Appeals

The lawsuit of Rivera Torres resulted from a typo.11l During
the processing of the debtors' 1995 tax return, an IRS technician
entered the wrong codes into the IRS computer system.1 12 As a
result, the debtors' tax refund was applied to a previously dis
charged debt, causing collection activities for that debt to
resume.1 13
After unsuccessfully attempting to resolve the matter directly
with the IRS, the debtors filed a motion for an order that the IRS
show cause why it should not be held in contempt for violating
§ 524.1 14 In its order for partial summary judgment in favor of the
debtors, the bankruptcy court held that "§ 106(a) abrogated sover
104. Atkins, 279 B.R. 639; Matthews, 184 B.R. 594.
105. Matthews, 184 B.R. at 600.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 600-01.
108. Atkins, 279 B.R. at 645. Between 1988 and 2000, the debtor was subjected to
continuous demand letters and telephone calls from the government, multiple reten
tions of income tax returns, and a foreclosure action. Id. at 641-45.
109. Id. at 645 (citation omitted). In fact, Judge Littlefield indicated that he
would have awarded punitive damages if such damages were not denied by § 106(a)(3).
Id. at 645-46.
110. Id. at 645.
111. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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eign immunity for monetary relief," which included emotional dis
tress damages. 115 When the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel upheld
the award of emotional distress damages,116 the IRS appealed that
decision to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 117
The First Circuit began its analysis by articulating the prevail
ing standard that a waiver of sovereign immunity "must be both
'unequivocally expressed' "118 and "'strictly construed in favor of
the sovereign.' "119 Responding to the question of scope, the court
cited Lane v. Pena,120 which stated that "to sustain a claim that the
Government is liable for awards of monetary damages, the waiver
must extend unambiguously to such monetary claims."121 The court
considered and ultimately rejected a broad reading of § 106(a)(3)'s
"an order, process, or judgment" language. 122
1. The Background Law Argument
In interpreting the waiver, the court first determined whether
emotional distress damages were allowed in similar situations prior
to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. 123 This approach, the court
reasoned, would most accurately depict the intent of Congress
when it drafted the 1994 amendments. 124 Prior to the 1994 amend
ments, only one circuit had considered whether § 524 allowed
courts to issue awards based on emotional distress. 125 In Burd v.
Walters,126 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the
bankruptcy courts' ability to issue awards for emotional distress
115. Id. at 22. The bankruptcy court rejected a claim for punitive damages based
on the wording of § 106 and rejected a claim for attorneys' fees and costs because the
debtors had failed to seek them in administrative proceedings. Id.
116. United States v. Rivera Torres (In re Rivera Torres), 309 B.R. 643, 652
(B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004), rev'd, 432 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2005).
117. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 22.
118. Id. at 23-24 (quoting Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 261
(1999».
119. Id. at 24 (quoting Ortf v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 602 (2005».
120. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
121. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 24 (citing Lane, 518 U.S. at 192).
122. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (2000».
123. Id. at 27. The court ignored several cases from the Eleventh Circuit that had
allowed emotional distress damages, stating that they were irrelevant because they were
decided after the 1994 amendments. Id. at 27-28. The cases cited by the court are Jove
Engineering, Inc. v. IRS (In re Jove Engineering), 92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996), and
Hardy v. United States (In re Hardy), 97 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1996).
124. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 25-26; see also BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29,
at 147-54 (stating persuasiveness of post-passage actions is less helpful in proving legis
lative intent than actions taken prior to passage).
125. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 27.
126. Burd v. Walters (In re Walters), 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989).
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damages, noting that, "no authority [was] offered to support the
proposition that emotional distress is an appropriate item of dam
ages for civil contempt, and we know of none. "127 The Rivera
Torres court also cited McBride v. Coleman,l28 which held that be
cause of problems regarding proof, emotional distress claims should
not be allowed where the enforcement instrument is civil con
tempt.J29 The court concluded, based on the absence of back
ground law, that the enumerated sections failed to provide a clear
waiver of sovereign immunity for emotional distress claims.130
2.

Defining "Money Recovery"

Next, the court examined whether, as the debtors claimed, the
term "money recovery" included an award for emotional distress
damages.131 The court used Bowen v. Massachusetts as its prece
dent. 132 Bowen held that the term "money damages" in the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act's sovereign immunity waiver 133 referred
only to specific relief such as compensatory damages. 134 The court
then analyzed the legislative history of § 106 for any evidence that
"the clear intent of Congress in enacting § 106 was to overrule cases
holding that no emotional distress damages were available."135 Ri
vera Torres concluded by noting that the express purpose of amend
ing § 106 was to overrule Hoffman and Nordic Village, neither of
which included a claim for emotional distress. 136 For these reasons,
the court held that § 106 contained no "definite[] and unequivo
127. Id. at 670 ("[N]o authority is offered to support the proposition that emo
tional distress is an appropriate item of damages for civil contempt, and we know of
none."). Since the case did not involve a federal government agency, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity was not discussed.
128. McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1992).
129. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 27 (citing McBride, 955 F.2d at 577).
130. Id. at 29.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988».
133. 5 U.S.c. § 702 (2000) ("An action in a court of the United States seeking
relief other than money damages ... shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied
on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indis
pensable party.").
134. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 895 ("Our cases have long recognized the distinction
between an action at law for damages-which are intended to provide a victim with
monetary compensation for an injury to his person, property, or reputation-and an
equitable action for specific relief-which may include [restitution and injunctive
relief]. ").
135. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 30.
136. Id. at 31.
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cal[] waiver of sovereign immunity" for emotional distress
claims.137
IV.

REVISITING DAMAGES

The Rivera Torres court, in rejecting a waiver of sovereign im
munity for emotional distress claims, held that "money recovery" as
referenced in § 106 does not include claims for emotional dis
tress. 138 However, this distinction seems to run afoul of the plain
language of the statute when one considers the way in which differ
ent types of damages and damage claims are defined and
characterized.
The generic term "damages" is used both to describe the harm
done to the plaintiff and his or her available legal remedy.139 Gen
erally, remedies are placed into four separate categories based on
purpose: "(1) [d]amages remedies, (2) [r]estitution[] remedies, (3)
[c]oercive remedies such as injunctions, or (4) [d]eclaratory
remedies. "140
A damage remedy is a money award that focuses on "making
good the plaintiff's losses."141 The goal of compensatory damages,
also referred to as "actual damages," is to place the plaintiff in the
same position he or she would have been in but for the defendant's
wrong. 142 Thus, the focus in compensatory damages is on the harm
done to the plaintiff. 143 Damages may be either specific, such as the
return of stolen property, or substitutional, such as requiring the
defendant to give the plaintiff the value of the damaged prop
erty.144 Despite the emphasis on valuation, this category also in
137. Id. A concurring opinion came to the same conclusion, but took issue with
the use of legislative histories in the analysis. Id. at 32 (Torruella, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 31 (majority opinion).
139. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES, DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 3
n.14 (2d ed. 1993); 1 JEROME H. NATES ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.01[1]
(Mark Wasserman et al. eds., 2002).
140. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 2; see also JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING
REMEDIES 5-10 (2006); NORMAN JAY lTZKOFF, Introduction, in DEALING WITH DAM.
AGES 1-6 (Norman Jay Itzkoff ed., 1983). Each type of damages was treated as a sepa
rate body of law until they were brought together in 1955 by Charles Alan Wright's
Cases on Remedies. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 2 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, REM
EDIES (Erwin N. Griswold ed., 1955».
141. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 3.
142. 1 NATES, supra note 139, § 1.01[3].
143. See Turcotte v. De Witt, 131 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Mass. 1955) (" 'Damages' is the
word which expresses in dollars and cents the injury sustained by a plaintiff.").
144. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 209; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies
for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1149-60 (1970) (describing specific
and substitution remedies).
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cludes claims in which valuation is difficult or impossible, such as
claims for pain and suffering and emotional distress. 145
The amount of a nominal damage award has no correlation to
harm or IOSS.146 Nominal damages are typically sought when the
plaintiff wishes to have an issue placed before the court but is una
ble to prove specific damages. 147
Punitive damages, also referred to as exemplary damages, are
those "damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages,
awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct
and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future."148 Traditionally, punitive damages were excluded from
courts of equity "either because equity's sole province was to pro
vide 'complete relief,' and compensatory damages marked the limit
of that relief, or because punishment or vengeance seemed vaguely
inappropriate to a 'benignant' equity."149 However, modern courts
often reject this limitation.1 50
Restitution remedies seek to prevent the unjust enrichment of
the defendant.1 51 Although. both restitution and compensatory
damages involve the return of money, restitution focuses only on
the gain realized by the defendant and not on the harm or loss in
curred by the plaintiff. 152 Restitution has both legal and equitable
145. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 211; 1 NATES, supra note 139, § 1.01[3].
146. [d. at 221. For this reason, they are described as "damages in name only."
[d.
147. [d. at 222.
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1965); see State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (citing punishment as a primary
purpose); Wilhelm v. Ryan, 903 A.2d 745, 752 (Del. 2006) (citing both punishment and
deterrence as purposes); Cabe v. Lunich, 640 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ohio 1994) (citing both
punishment and deterrence as purposes). Deterrence may be specific, deterring the
defendant from engaging in similar conduct, or general, aiming to set an example that
will deter others from engaging in similar conduct. 2 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY &
LITIGATION § 21:4 (J.D. Lee & Barry A. Lindahl eds., 2d ed. 2002); Dan B. Dobbs,
Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 831, 844-46 (1989).
149. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 315 (citation omitted).
150. E.g., I. H. P. Corp. v. 210 Cent. Park S. Corp., 189 N.E.2d 812,813 (N.Y.
1963) ("[This line of reasoning] presupposes a court intrinsically limited to granting
remedies solely equitable in historical origin. There is no such court in this State.").
151. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 4; see Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Signifi
cance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1279 (1989).
152. Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia Reinvents Restitution, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1063, 1066 (2003); see Amber Res. Co. v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 738, 742 (2006)
(citing E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990».
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origins, depending upon the type of restitution sought. 153 For ex
ample, an action for replevin 154 has its roots in law while an action
seeking a constructive trust1 55 has its roots in equity, yet both are
considered to be remedies of restitution. 156
Injunctions act as a personal command by the court to the de
fendant to either "act or avoid acting in a certain way."157 Injunc
tions are also referred to as in personam orders or orders for
specific performance.l5 8 Based in equity, a violation of an injunc
tion is punishable by contempt of court. 159
Declaratory remedies seek to accurately interpret a party's
rights.160 Declaratory judgments typically involve the court's deter
mination of one party's rights in an ambiguous contract or the con
stitutionality of a law or regulation. 161 Jurisdictional bars against
the issuance of advisory opinions often hamper the issuance of de
claratory remedies. 162
All remedies serve to redress the wrong done to a party.163
Remedies "developed both to complement substantive law and to
meet the needs of litigants. "164 Because of the broad scope of rem
edies and the diverse needs of litigants, it is essential that practition
ers understand the different classifications of damages, their
individual purposes, and the forms used to achieve those ends. 165
In the context of sovereign immunity waivers, understanding reme
dies is all the more important because the waiver may be limited to
certain categories of remedies. 166
153. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 9. See generally Thomas, supra note 152, at 1066
68 (describing the distinctions between legal and equitable restitution).
154. Replevin is "[a]n action for the repossession of personal property wrongfully
taken or detained by the defendant, whereby the plaintiff gives security for and holds
the property until the court decides who owns it." BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY 1325
(8th ed. 2004).
155. A constructive trust is "[a]n equitable remedy that a court imposes against
one who has obtained property by wrongdoing. [It is] imposed to prevent unjust en
richment ...." /d. at 1547.
156. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 9.
157. Id. at 5.
158. Id. at 6.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Id. at 7; see BLACK'S LAW DIGnONARY, supra note 154, at 859 (defining
declaratory judgment as "[a] binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other
legal relations of the parties without providing for or ordering enforcement").
161. DOBBS, supra note 139, at 53.
162. Id. at 7.
163. FISCHER, supra note 140, at 2.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id.
166. See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).
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ANALYSIS: A SECOND LOOK AT IN RE RIVERA TORRES

The remainder of this Note will argue that the In re Rivera
Torres court was incorrect in denying emotional distress damages
on the basis that sovereign immunity was not explicitly waived for
such damages. First, this Part will argue that emotional distress
claims are included in § 106 through the use of the term "money
recovery."167 This Part will also argue that allowing this type of
remedy is consistent with the legislative history of § 106. Further
more, this Part will illustrate that allowing a waiver of sovereign
immunity for emotional distress claims is consistent with the pur
poses and policies of bankruptcy law in general. Finally, this Part
will respond to the primary criticism of allowing emotional distress
damages, arguing that this criticism is not a sound justification for
precluding a waiver of sovereign immunity.
A.

Finding the Plain Meaning of "Money Recovery"

The plain meaning doctrine is the most commonly stated rule
of statutory interpretation today.168 The plain meaning doctrine as
sumes that the legislature used the words, grammar, and punctua
tion of a statute in a "normal" way to communicate its intent,
therefore the words, grammar, and punctuation are given the mean
ing that they would ordinarily produce. 169 Ambiguous statutory
terms lead to uncertainty in meaning and scope.11° Since the term
"money recovery" in § 106 fails to clearly delineate the orders and
judgments it properly includes, it is inherently vague. l71 To under
stand this vague term, this Part begins where the Rivera Torres
court began: § 106's legislative history.1 72
167. 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(3) (2000).
168. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 38.
169. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). But see BROWN &
BROWN, supra note 29, at 39 ("[W]hat may seem perfectly clear to one person may not
be to another, particularly when the language produces an outcome that the person
finds unacceptable.").
170. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND ApPLICATION OF STATUTES
43-49 (1975).
171. See id. at 49 ("Most words that denote classes or categories ... have ele
ments of vagueness."). However, in certain situations, vagueness may be desirable
(e.g., planning for unexpected contingencies and protecting against accidental omis
sion). !d.
172. Where statutory language is ambiguous, courts will look to the legislative
history in order to ascertain congressional intent. United States v. Alky Enters., Inc.,
969 F.2d 1309, 1314 (1st CiT. 1992). This approach has been criticized as unreliable.
United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 320 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that legislative histories are often more vague than the statutes themselves);
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Understanding Section 106's Legislative History

In rejecting a waiver of sovereign immunity for emotional dis
tress claims, the Rivera Torres court stated that emotional distress
damages would only be allowed if the purpose of the 1994 amend
ments were to overrule a case denying them.173 The court correctly
concluded that the 1994 amendments sought to overrule the hold
ings of Hoffman and Nordic Village.174 The court in Rivera Torres
reasoned that because emotional distress damages were not in
cluded in those cases, Congress did not intend for the 1994 amend
ments to address those damages.17 5 However, the following Part
demonstrates that Congress did in fact account for emotional dis
tress claims by including language to support a waiver for compen
satory damages.
The 1994 amendments to § 106 evidence the congressional in
tent that the waiver of sovereign immunity should be broadly inter
preted. As the Rivera Torres court cites, the 1994 amendments
were enacted specifically to overturn Hoffman and Nordic Vil
lage.17 6 The purpose of the 1994 amendments was to clarify the
confusion regarding the allowable remedies by making the waiver
of sovereign immunity more explicit.177 Furthermore, these amend
ments reject a strict interpretation of statutory waivers. The House
Report on the 1994 amendments states that the intent of the origi
nal § 106 was to subject both the states and the federal government
to waivers of sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings.178 In
order to make the statement "unmistakenly clear," the words, "in
cluding an order awarding a money recovery" were added to the
DICKERSON, supra note 170, at 155 ("[Legislative materials] are so heterogeneous and
fragmentary and so influenced by the tactics of promoting enactment that they have
almost no credibility for the purposes of later interpretation." (citation omitted»; see In
re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 32 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the majority's conclusion but taking issue with the use of legislative history to
interpret the statute). See generally Steven Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth
Lecture: On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
845 (1992) (discussing the use of legislative histories in determining legislative intent,
including examples of situations in which such use is especially helpful or
inappropriate).
173. Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d at 30.
174. Id. at 31.
175. Id. at 30-31.
176. Id. at 31; H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42 (1994), as reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3350-51.
177. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42.
178. Id.
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new version of the statuteP9 The congressional intent remained
the same: In bankruptcy cases, government actors should be liable
for compensatory damage awards. l80
2.

Reading the Statute in Remedy Terms

The best method of understanding how the statute classifies
damages is to look at its grammatical structure.1 81 Section 106 con
tains three distinct clauses, each serving a vital role in the overall
meaning of the statute. To best understand Congress's intent, one
must examine the effect that each clause has on the section's overall
structure.
The first clause of the statute states: "The court may issue
against a governmental unit an order, process, or judgment under
such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. "182 If
this clause was the only language in the statute, the bankruptcy
court would be free to make any order or judgment possible, as this
clause puts no restriction on the types of remedies available. The
bankruptcy court would be empowered to issue injunctions and de
claratory rulings, as well as order compensatory, restitution, and pu
nitive damages.
The language of the first clause of the amended statute is simi
lar to the original version,183 which was held by the courts in Hoff
179. See id. (noting that the construction used in Hoffman was "narrow").
180. See id. ("It is the Committee's intent to make section 106 conform to the
Congressional intent of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 waiving the sovereign im
munity of the States and the Federal Government in this regard."); see also 140 CONGo
REC. 27,699 (1994) (statement of Rep. Berman).
First, I am very pleased by the inclusion of Section 113 in the bill, effectively
overruling the decisions of the Supreme Court in U.S. versus Nordic Village
and Hoffman versus Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, and
clarifying the original intent of Congress in enacting Section 106 of the Bank
ruptcy Code with regard to sovereign immunity.
Id.
181. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) ("The
language and punctuation Congress used cannot be read in any other way."). But see
Barrett v. Van Pelt, 268 U.S. 85, 91 (1925) ('''Punctuation is a minor, and not a control
ling, element in interpretation, and courts will disregard the punctuation of a statute or
re-punctuate it, if need be, to give effect to what otherwise appears to be its purpose
and true meaning.'" (quoting Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Voelker, 129 F. 522, 527 (8th
Cir. 1904))).
182. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (2000).
183. See 11 U.S.c. § 106(a) (1978) (amended 1994), as reprinted in 2 COLLIER,
supra note 13, 'II 106.LH[1] ("A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign
immunity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is property of
the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or occurrences out of which such
governmental unit's claim arose.").
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man and Nordic Village to allow only equitable remedies. l84 For
this reason, Congress amended the section in 1994, effectively ad
ding a second and third clause to the section.18S The second clause,
"including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery," rein
forces the bankruptcy courts' existing powers under the first
clause. 186 In effect, Congress was expressing its intent that the
courts not be limited to mere injunctive and declaratory relief, but
rather their powers of relief shall include the ability to award a
"money recovery. "187
By enacting the 1994 amendments to § 106, Congress over
ruled Hoffman and Nordic Village, thus allowing a waiver of sover
eign immunity for compensatory damages. 188 For this reason,
"money recovery" cannot be interpreted to include equitable reme
dies, as the court would have retained such powers under the pre
amendment version of § 106.1 89 Furthermore, interpreting "money
recovery" to include only injunctive or declarative relief renders the
second clause "mere surplusage," since the first clause covers all
orders and judgments without restriction. Statutes must be read so
that, if possible, "'no clause, sentence, or word becomes superflu
ous, void, or insignificant.' "190 The legislative history demonstrates
that the purpose of including the phrase "money recovery" in the
statute was to make "unmistakenly clear" that the statute encom
passed more than just declaratory and injunctive relief. 191 To com
pletely resolve the ambiguity in the term "money recovery" all
three clauses of § 106 must be read together.1 92 This leaves as pos
sibilities only compensatory damages, punitive damages, and legally
based restitution.

184. United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-37 (1992); Hoffman v.
Conn. Dep't of Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96, 102 (1989).
185. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
186. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3).
187. See H.R. REp. No. 103-835, at 42 (1994), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340, 3350-51; 140 CONGo REc. 27,699 (1994) (statement of Rep. Berman).
188. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42.
189. See Nordic Village, 503 U.S. at 33-37; Hoffman, 492 U.S. at 102.
190. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19,31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker,
533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)); BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 84.
191. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 42 ("This amendment expressly provides for a
waiver of sovereign immunity by governmental units with respect to monetary recov
eries as well as declaratory and injunctive relief.").
192. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 89; see also Massachusetts v. Morash,
490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989).
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The third clause of § 106 provides further clarity of the phrase
"money recovery" by explicitly precluding punitive damages. 193
The exclusion of punitive damages is an essential element of the
statute that the In re Rivera Torres court ignores in its analysis. 194
Since the statute consists of a general provision followed by a clari
fication and an express limitation, it seems the more proper course
of action would be to find an extension of the limitation rather than
to find a specific allowance. 195 Thus, the first clause allows for equi
table remedies, such as injunctive or declarative relief, and the third
clause restricts punitive damages, leaving compensatory damages as
the only remedy available to be included as a "money recovery."
Emotional distress damages are compensatory damages, and as
such, are included in the term "money recovery."196 Emotional dis
tress damages are awarded to make the plaintiff emotionally whole
in the same manner as other compensatory damages, such as those
involving personal injury.1 97
Emotional distress is an actual injury. Our emotions can wreak
havoc with our nervous system, often having physical side effects.
Emotional distress is not an ethereal proposition or an intangible
concept. The stress is felt not by the inanimate object, the check
bouncing or the account freezing. Rather, the emotions belong
to and are felt by the owner of the bounced check and the frozen
account. 198
193. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(3) (2000).
194. See generally Morash, 490 U.S. at 115 (" '[I]n expounding a statute, we are
not guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of
the whole law, and to its object and policy.'" (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987»); BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 89 ("[T]he statute is to be
read as a whole.").
195. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 82-83 ("The coverage of the statue
[sic] is the norm and the exception is the unusual, so the presumption is that those
things not specifically excepted were to follow the norm, i.e., not be excepted.").
196. See Murphy v. IRS, 460 F.3d 79, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated, No. 05-5139,
2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 32293 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 22, 2006), affd on reh'g, No. 05-5139,
2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 15816 (D.C. Cir. July 3, 2007) (holding that emotional distress
claims are compensatory damages); Leveille v. N.Y. Air Nat'! Guard, No. 98-079, 1999
WL 966951, at *2 (Admin. Rev. Bd., U.S. Dep't of Labor Oct. 25, 1999) ("Compensa
tory damages are designed to compensate discriminatees not only for direct pecuniary
loss, but also for such harms as impairment of reputation, personal humiliation, and
mental anguish and suffering."); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 (1978) (stat
ing mental and emotional distress constitute compensable injuries in a § 1983 case).
197. Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 (holding that mental and emotional distress constitute
compensable injuries in § 1983 case); Murphy, 460 F.3d at 88-92 (stating that emotional
distress awards are compensatory under Internal Revenue Code).
198. Holden v. United States (In re Holden), 226 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1998).
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The logic, therefore, is very simple: If emotional distress dam
ages are a compensatory claim, and the "money recovery" language
expressly authorizes compensatory damages, then the waiver
should cover the claim for emotional distress. 199
Clarification of the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 106
can also be found in the manner in which Congress has explicitly
limited the remedies. 20o Congress's limitation on awards of puni
tive damages establishes intent to exclude "categories" of damages
and not particular claims. 201 Singling out a specific claim for exclu
sion is inconsistent with the text of the statute. 202 Remedies can be
classified by category and claim. 203 Categories broadly define the
purpose and effect of the remedies available, while claims are nar
rowly tailored to the precise injury suffered. 204 Section 106 does
not separate remedies by claim, but rather by category, namely, eq
uitable, compensatory, and punitive. 205
B.

Emotional Distress Damages and the Discharge Injunction

Waiving sovereign immunity for awards of emotional distress
damages is consistent with the purposes of a discharge injunction.
Historically speaking, the discharge developed as governments real
ized that proper bankruptcy administration required that debtors
be protected from overzealous creditors. 206 Indeed, debtors often
199. Cf Michelle Miller, Comment, The Fox vs. the Hedgehog: Why Purely Emo
tional Damages Should Be Recoverable Under § 11 u.s.c. 362(h), 4 DEPAUL Bus &
COMM. L.J. 497 (2006) (applying the same logical formula to the phrase "actual dam
ages" within 11 U.s.c. § 362(h) (2000».
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 106.
201. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 29, at 90 (stating that a specific provision
controls a general provision).
202. Id.
203. See DOBBS, supra note 139, at 2 (classifying remedies by category based on
general purpose); CHARLES MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 1-3 (1935), reprinted in KELLIS E.
PARKER, MODERN JUDICIAL REMEDIES 21-22 (3d ed. 1975) (tying individual claims to
the specific violation of right).
204. FISCHER, supra note 140, at 2 ("The coupling of the concepts of wrong and
remedy helps demonstrate the essential purpose of remedies, which is to redress the
wrong ...."); MCCORMICK, supra note 203, at 1-3.
205. 11 U.S.C. § 106; see also Thomas, supra note 152, at 1083 ("Focusing on the
purpose or goal of the remedy rather than on the superficial form of the relief would
better preserve remedial rights of plaintiffs and keep the power of courts intact to rem
edy wrongs.").
206. McCoid, supra note 59, at 192 ("Seen in historical context, the discharge was
the ultimate instrument of the transformation of bankruptcy from a creditors' collection
remedy to a system of statutorily mandated composition mutually beneficial to debtors
and creditors."); Wasson, supra note 40, at 96 ("An aspect of this shift [from punish
ment to rehabilitation] was the growing recognition that effective rehabilitation meant
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see the discharge as a principal reason to enter bankruptcy proceed
ings. 207 To protect cooperating debtors, bankruptcy courts rou
tinely issue actual damage awards against creditors who violate the
discharge injunction. 208 Because the discharge injunction is meant
to protect the debtor from the same actions that can form the basis
of an emotional distress claim, such claims are appropriate to fulfill
the "fresh start" objective of the Bankruptcy Code. 209 For govern
ment creditors to induce debtors to enter bankruptcy with the
promise of discharge only to hide behind sovereign immunity when
they attempt to collect on the discharged debts, is counterproduc
tive to both the "fresh start" policy the discharge injunction is
meant to support, and to the express language of the § 106 immu
nity waiver. 210

that debtors could not be hounded continuously to pay discharged debts."); see also
Miller, supra note 199, at 508-09 ("The Bankruptcy Code, while it may have an overall
financial aim, was drafted with reference to the emotional incidents of bankruptcy
.... ").
207. See GARY KLEIN ET AL., SURVIVING DEBT 15 (3d ed. 1999) ("Bankruptcy
can ... be used to get a creditor to back off of aggressive collection efforts."); 4 COL
LIER, supra note 57, 'II 524.LH[I] (noting the frequent practice of unscrupulous creditors
coercing debtors into paying discharged debts); see also McCoid, supra note 59, at 186
(noting that the discharge is a compromise between allowing the debtor to retain
enough assets to induce compliance and retaining enough debts to satisfy creditors);
Wasson, supra note 40, at 103 ("[I]nsupportable debt forced upon debtors by such [co
ercive] tactics [is] likely to lead them into bankruptcy again or cause them to default on
their obligations to post-discharge creditors and pre-discharge creditors who have com
plied with the detailed provisions for a valid reaffirmation agreement.").
208. In re Meyers, 344 B.R. 61, 66-67 (Bankr. D. Pa. 2006) ("One significant re
medial purpose of a bankruptcy discharge order is to prevent the emotionally harmful
conduct associated with debt collection tactics."); In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 357, 370
(Bankr. D. Ohio 2003) ("[T]his Court has traditionally awarded actual damages ... to a
debtor injured by a ... violation of the discharge injunction.").
209. Meyers, 344 B.R. at 67.
Regardless whether it is appropriate to award damages for emotional distress
for the violation of a court order in other contexts, in my view, such damages
should be awarded (when suffered by a debtor) for violation of a bankruptcy
discharge order. This is because there is a direct nexus between the purpose of
the discharge order and the emotional distress which may result from the vio
lation of the order.
Id.

210. See S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5815
("[T]he policy [of section 106] is designed to achieve approximately the same result that
would prevail outside of bankruptcy."); see also Greene, supra note 68, 558 ("Section
106 was included in the Bankruptcy Code to provide a level playing field for debtors to
realize their claims against the government in an efficient and practical manner. ").
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C. Judicial Anxiety Toward Emotional Distress Claims
The overriding objection to allowing bankruptcy judges to hear
emotional distress claims is that these claims are too complex and
too easy to manufacture for bankruptcy judges to adequately assess
them. 211 This criticism is not limited to bankruptcy judges; there
exists a longstanding judicial anxiety towards emotional distress
claims.
The law has always been wary of claims of emotional distress,
because they are so easy to manufacture. For a long time dam
ages for such distress were generally limited to cases in which the
plaintiff was able to prove some other injury.... The courts have
grown more confident of their ability to sift and value claims of
emotional distress, and the old limitations have largely been
abandoned; but suspicion lingers ....212
There are two reasons for this hesitation. First, there is a gen
eral distrust in the claims themselves; that is, that an unscrupulous
plaintiff could easily claim to have suffered an emotional injury.213
Second, there is the more specific fear that bankruptcy judges, so
focused on a single area of law, will not be able to properly evaluate
those claims before them.214 Aside from the anxiety regarding the
emotional distress claims themselves, some believe emotional dis
tress claims are beyond the scope of a bankruptcy court's power. 215
211. McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The problems of
proof, assessment, and appropriate compensation attendant to awarding damages for
emotional distress are troublesome enough in the ordinary tort case, and should not be
imported into civil contempt proceedings.").
212. Aiello v. Providian Fin. Corp., 239 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
213. Id.; McBride, 955 F.2d at 577.
214. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 879-80 ("[B]ankruptcy judges are not selected with refer
ence to their likely ability to evaluate claims of emotional injury.").
215. Ahart, supra note 95, at 50.
A bankruptcy judge has virtually no implied authority under federal law.
She should not rely on inherent powers to sanction parties, dismiss a case,
punish for abuse of process or contempt of court, to deny compensation to
professionals employed by the estate, or to grant any other relief except per
haps an order necessary for the court to perform its legitimate function. She
should rarely, if ever, formulate any new federal common law or imply a pri
vate right of action under any section of the Code. While she has some statu
tory equitable powers, she has no non-statutory general equitable authority.
She should refrain from referring to herself as a "court of equity." A bank
ruptcy judge should not deny a party to a legal cause of action the right to trial
by jury simply because the party filed a proof of claim, counterclaim, a bank
ruptcy petition or the action itself in the bankruptcy court. She ought not
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None of the previous three concerns are sufficient justification
for denying emotional distress claims for violation of a discharge
injunction. Since the cause of action first arose, progress has been
made in creating a process so that fraudulent claims are found and
disrnissed.2 16 The appropriate method of stopping fraudulent
claims of emotional distress is strictly enforcing the burden of
proof, not creating a judicially imposed bar. 217 The appellate pro
cess is also available to correct any mistakes that slip through the
gap.218
The argument that bankruptcy judges are somehow less quali
fied to assess emotional distress claims is also an unjustified ratio
nale for denying such claims. It seems unreasonable to assume that
bankruptcy judges work in a "bankruptcy vacuum" and are there
fore only qualified to handle that one area of the law. 219 Bank
ruptcy judges, like all judges, are selected based on their extensive
educational achievements and practical experience. 22o Further
more, bankruptcy judges are not political appointees, but rather are
selected based on merit by a majority of judges from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. 221 Finally, while claims of emotional distress
may be more difficult to demonstrate than physical torts such as
battery, bankruptcy judges have a preexisting legal standard and
case law on which to fall back. 222
invoke equitable principles, defenses, doctrines or remedies to make bank
ruptcy law or vary bankruptcy statutes or bankruptcy rules.
Id.; see also McBride, 955 F.2d at 577 (holding that civil contempt power is not an
appropriate vehicle for emotional distress claims).
216. Aiello, 239 F.3d at 880 ("The courts have grown more confident of their
ability to sift and value claims of emotional distress ...."); see also Stinson v. Bi-Rite
Rest. Supply, Inc. (In re Stinson), 295 B.R. 109, 128 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is one
thing to assert emotional distress, but it is quite another thing to persuade a bankruptcy
judge to find that emotional distress existed."), affd in part and rev'd in part, 128 F.
App'x 30 (9th Cir. 2005).
217. Bishop v. U.S. BankIFirstar Bank, N.A. (In re Bishop), 296 B.R. 890, 897
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2003).
218. Stinson, 295 B.R. at 128 ("While I doubt that bankruptcy judges would ever
establish a pattern of abusing their authority to award emotional distress damages, I am
confident that the appellate process would correct abuses.").
219. Miller, supra note 199, at 510; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuer
R. 1.1 cmt. 2 (2004) (stating that expert knowledge is not required to fulfill a lawyer's
requirement of competent representation).
220. Miller, supra note 199, at 510 n.103 ("Bankruptcy judges are graduates at the
top of their class from top tier law schools and active in a wide variety of legal organiza
tions and publications.").
221. U.S. Courts, Federal Judiciary Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.uscourts.gov/faq.html (last visited July 20, 2007).
222. See In re Perviz, 302 B.R. 357, 371 (Bankr. D. Ohio 2003).
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The contention that emotional distress claims are beyond the
scope of a bankruptcy court's power is also without merit. Despite
the initial knee-jerk reaction against hearing tort claims in a bank
ruptcy court, the bankruptcy courts may only hear such claims if
they relate to a preexisting bankruptcy claim. 223 Section 106 was
designed to maximize efficiency by allowing a debtor to litigate all
related claims in one forum.224 Additionally, this argument stands
against the prevailing view that § 105 grants bankruptcy courts
broad powers. 225
Although the degree appears to be relatively minor, this hesita
tion played a role in the Rivera Torres decision. In dicta, the court
noted that it would assume that the debtors met the standard for
emotional distress damages "with some skepticism."226 The court
also cited language from McBride v. Coleman, which exhibits this
hesitancy as a rationale for disallowing emotional distress c1aims.227
[W]hen a "willful" violation of the discharge injunction is at issue, damages for
mental!emotional distress may be awarded, despite the absence of any demon
strable out-of-pocket losses, if two conditions are met: (1) the debtor clearly
suffered some appreciable emotional!mental harm; and (2) the actions giving
rise to the emotional/mental distress were severe in nature. As it concerns the
former requirement, actual medical testimony is helpful, but not always
needed. In this regard, the greater the extent of the creditor's violation, the
less corroborating evidence, including medical testimony, that will be needed
to establish that the debtor suffered from an appreciable amount of emotional!
mental distress so as to be compensable. The converse is also true, and thus
the less severe the creditor's conduct, the more important corroborating evi
dence will become, particularly medical testimony, to sustain a case for com
pensatory damages based upon emotional/mental distress.
Id. (citations omitted).
223. 11 U.S.c. § 106(a)(2) (2000); Stinson, 295 B.R. at 128 (applying the same
logic to emotional distress claims based on a violation of a § 362(h) automatic stay); see
also 11 U.S.c. § 106(b) (waiving sovereign immunity against counterclaims).
224. Greene, supra note 68, at 558 ("Rather than prolong the debtor's tortured
existence in bankruptcy by dragging the debtor through different courts to litigate cer
tain claims, Congress wanted to make the bankruptcy court a one-stop federal court for
claims against the sovereign.").
225. United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545,549 (1990) ("These statutory
directives are consistent with the traditional understanding that bankruptcy courts, as
courts of equity, have broad authority to modify creditor-debtor relationships."); 2 COL
LIER, supra note 13, 'lI 105.01[2] (noting that the prevailing view sees § 105 as granting
the bankruptcy courts broad authority to fill statutory gaps in the Bankruptcy Code);
see also supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (describing § 105's evolution and the
expanding powers of the bankruptcy courts).
226. In re Rivera Torres, 432 F.3d 20, 23 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005).
227. Id. at 27 (" 'The problems of proof, assessment, and appropriate compensa
tion attendant to awarding damages for emotional distress are troublesome enough in
the ordinary tort case, and should not be imported into civil contempt proceedings.'"
(quoting McBride v. Coleman, 955 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1992»).
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Regardless of the degree to which this factor was afforded consider
ation in determining the outcome of the case, a court's hesitancy or
disfavor of a particular claim should not affect whether the statu
tory language extends a waiver of sovereign immunity for that
claim.
CONCLUSION

This Note has shown that the In re Rivera Torres court made
several crucial mistakes in interpreting § 106. A plain reading of
the language of § 106, coupled with the specific purposes for its en
actment, demonstrates the congressional intent to waive sovereign
immunity for awards of compensatory damages. Emotional distress
damages, which seek to compensate the plaintiff for his or her emo
tional harm, must be included in this waiver. To single out a spe
cific claim of compensatory damages is antithetical to the specific
wording and structure of § 106. Since Congress chose to exclude
relief on the basis of broad categories, rather than individual claims,
it is beyond the scope of a bankruptcy court's authority to scrutinize
the different causes of action within those categories.
Bankruptcy is an emotionally charged experience for debtors.
To ease the process, the discharge injunction was developed. Emo
tional distress damages should not be singled out merely because
they are controversial or hard to qualify. Any fear that such dam
ages are subject to fraud can be most appropriately handled by ap
plying and enforcing a strict burden of proof rather than simply
precluding their availability to those plaintiffs who, given their fi
nancial situation, are likely to be emotionally harmed by callus or
overzealous creditors.
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In sum, where a debtor can make a legitimate case that a gov
ernment creditor has emotionally harmed him in the direct course
of a bankruptcy action, § 106's waiver of sovereign immunity should
not be used to bar the claim.
Robert A. McDonald*
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